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ABSTRACT 
 
With the rise of the digital age, social media has become a tool for communication in the 
modern world. The law on social media in South Africa is underdeveloped and there is an 
absence of current legislation that specifically deals with social media. 
 
Employees are often under the impression that they are permitted to say anything they desire 
on social media platforms without consequence. Problems arise when employees take to social 
media to vent their frustrations about work and post derogatory comments about their 
employer(s). 
 
In the absence of legislation specifically regulating the use of social media, an employer will 
often rely on the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 in order to dismiss an employee for 
misconduct of the kind mentioned above. Employees for their part will often cite constitutional 
rights such as the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy as defences against 
being unfairly dismissed for their social media posts.  
 
This study aims to determine whether or not the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is still fit for 
purpose in view of the rapid and exponential rise of social media during recent years. The main 
focus of this study is on the dismissal of employees for posting derogatory comments about 
their employees on social media and seeks to determine whether or not South African Labour 
Legislation has adequately kept pace in this area
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
1.1     Aim of dissertation 
 
1.1.1 The research question 
Whether or not the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Act’) is still 
fit for purpose in view of the rapid and exponential rise of social media during recent years. 
 
1.1.2 Statement of purpose 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the Act1 is still fit for purpose in view 
of the rapid and exponential rise of social media during recent years. 
 
1.1.3 The rationale for this study 
In light of the absence of current legislation dealing with social media, the rationale for this 
study is to determine whether or not South African labour legislation2 has adequately kept pace 
with the rise of social media in the digital age and whether or not the Act3 is still fit for the 
purpose of dealing with dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media. 
 
This dissertation will also examine a number of issues surrounding this central question, such 
as the desirability of South African businesses enacting a social media policy in the workplace; 
and the manner in which the constitutional rights to freedom of expression4 and privacy5 inform 
and impact upon debates in this area. 
 
1.2     Breakdown of chapters 
1.2.1  Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 will discuss the increase in dismissals for derogatory comments posted by employees 
on social media. It will examine the rise of social media and it will raise the question as to 
                                                          
1 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) s 16. 
5 Ibid., s 14. 
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whether or not the current Labour Relations Act6 is fit for purpose in relation to derogatory 
comments posted by employees on social media. 
 
1.2.2  Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 will analyse in detail the Labour Relations Act7 as it relates to derogatory comments 
posted by employees on social media. The grounds and the factors for dismissal will be looked 
at.8  It will then be determined whether or not the posting of derogatory comments on social 
media amounts to misconduct9 in terms of the Act.10 The Act11 implies that misconduct12 
encompasses a breach of good faith13 as well as a breach of a workplace rule.14 These two 
concepts will be discussed in detail.  
 
Under the duty of good faith concept,15 the Act16 and the common law will be discussed. The 
good faith concept17 will then be analysed as it relates to derogatory comments posted by 
employees on social media. 
 
Under the workplace rule concept,18 the Act19 and the common law will be discussed. The 
workplace rule concept20 will then be analysed as it relates to derogatory comments posted by 
employees on social media. This analysis will look at two situations namely; dismissals where 
there are workplace rules21 in place; and dismissals where there are no workplace rules22 in 
place. It is suggested that a workplace rule23 may take the form of a social media policy which 
employers are able to implement in the workplace.  
 
 
                                                          
6 LRA (note 1 above). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 2(2) & 3(5). 
9 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
10 LRA (note 1 above).  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
13 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
14 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
15 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
16 LRA (note 1 above). 
17 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
18 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
19 LRA (note 1 above). 
20 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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1.2.3  Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 will discuss the desirability of social media policies. In particular, the following will 
be discussed: 
 
i. the reasons why many businesses have not enacted a social media policy;  
ii. the advantages and disadvantages of enacting a social media policy;  
iii. how a social media policy may be implemented;  
iv. an example of a social media policy which might be suitable in the South African context; 
and  
v. the risks of not enacting and implementing a social media policy. 
 
1.2.4  Chapters 5 and 6 
Having discussed social media policies, this dissertation will turn to the manner in which 
certain constitutional rights inform and impact upon debates in this area. These are tensions in 
South African law that have been created by social media; and arise when employees often cite 
constitutional rights such as the right to freedom of expression24 and the right to privacy25 as 
defences against being dismissed for derogatory comments posted on social media. Chapters 5 
and 6 will briefly discuss the right to freedom of expression26 and the right to privacy27 as it 
relates to derogatory comments posted by employees on social media. 
 
1.2.5  Chapter 7 
Lastly Chapter 7 will conclude that certain provisions of the Act28 are still fit for purpose in 
terms of dismissals for derogatory comments posted by employees on social media, while there 
are other provisions of the Act29 that have not kept pace with the rapid and exponential rise of 
social media during the recent years.
                                                          
24 Constitution (note 5 above) s 16. 
25 Ibid., s 14. 
26 Ibid., s 16. 
27 Ibid., s 14. 
28 LRA (note 1 above). 
29 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 2  
INCREASE IN DISMISSALS FOR DEROGATORY COMMENTS POSTED BY 
EMPLOYEES ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
2. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
With the rise of the digital age, social media has become one of the main tools for 
communication in the modern world.30 A significant number of people use social media to 
communicate their thoughts and share content with the world.31 Social media is accessed on 
technological devices such as smart phones, tablets, laptops and the like. The law32 relating to 
social media in South Africa is underdeveloped and there is very little current labour 
legislation33 that specifically deals with social media.34 
 
2.1     Increase in dismissals for derogatory comments posted by employees on social media 
De Vos acknowledges that ‘there is something about internet websites and social media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter that seem[s] to bring out the worst in people’.35 Employees 
are often under the impression that they are permitted to say anything they desire on social 
media platforms without consequence.36 The distinction between one’s private and 
professional life becomes blurred; and conflicts in the workplace arise when employees post 
derogatory comments about their employer(s) on social media.37  
 
2.2     Definition of ‘derogatory’ 
According to an online dictionary38 the definition of ‘derogatory’ means something that is 
‘insulting, disrespectful, unflattering, unkind, or demeaning’.39 When employees take to social 
media to post a derogatory comment about their employer(s), this may result in dismissal.40 
                                                          
30 Fredericks v Jo Barkett Fashions 2011 JOL 27923 (CCMA) para 6.3. 
31 L Clark and SJ Roberts ‘Employer’s Use of Social Networking Sites: A Socially Irresponsible Practice’ (2010) 
95 (4) Journal of Business Ethics 507–525. 
32 LRA (note 1 above). 
33 Ibid. 
34 R Davey ‘Dismissals for Social Media Misconduct’ (2012) 6 De Rebus 80. 
35 P De Vos ‘Defamation and Social Media: We have moved on from Jane Austen’ (2013) Constitutionally 
Speaking<http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/defamation-and-social-media-we-have-moved-on-from-
janeausten> (accessed 15 June 2016). 
36 Sedick (note 138 below) para 53; National Union of Food (note 161 below) para 17 and; Fredericks (note 31 
above) para 6.4 (Case law on fair dismissals). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Vocabulary.Com Dictionary. 
39 Ibid., < https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/derogatory> (accessed 1 May 2016). 
40 See item  3 (4) of  Schedule 8 of the LRA (note 1 above) which states that an employer may dismiss an employee 
for ‘misconduct that is serious and of such gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship 
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There has been an increase in dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media 
because of the recent rise in the use of social media.41  
 
2.3     Problems in the workplace resulting from the use of social media 
Various authors have pointed out the types of problems which have emerged in the workplace 
as a result of the recent rise in the use of social media as follows: 
 
D’Mello states that ‘our private use of social media could be one of the pitfalls of the modern 
workplace’,42 while Duff states that ‘employees who vent their frustration of their employer, 
in a public forum such as Facebook, are opening themselves up to a potential law suit or 
dismissal’.43  
 
The Southern African Legal Information Institute states that it ‘has seen an increase in the 
number of people who are dismissed for social media misconduct’.44 According to Bennington, 
social media ‘status firings have become downright common’.45  
 
Angermair et al add that ‘during the last five to seven years we have seen a number of cases 
across the world on the subject’.46 According to Davey and Dahms-Jansen ‘social media usage 
is becoming increasingly topical (as is) clear from the recent spate of CCMA cases dealing 
with dismissals for social media misconduct’.47  
                                                          
intolerable’; as well as items 1 (3) & 7 of Schedule 8 of the LRA (note 1 above); and the case of Costa/Nu 
Metro Theatres (note 129 below) 1027 which held ‘that it is now established law that an employee may be 
disciplined for misconduct that takes place outside working hours provided the misconduct negatively impacts 
on the employment relationship’ (Employers’ right to dismissal). 
41 Case law on fair dismissals (note 37 above). 
42 CD Mello ‘The Perils of Social Media for Employees’ (2016) Sydney Morning Herald 
<http://www.smh.com.au/small-business/managing/the-perils-of-social-media-for-employees-20160308-
gndly7.html> (accessed 15 June 2016). 
43 A Duff ‘Can an Employer Dismiss due to Facebook?’ (2010) 36(2) Packaging Review South Africa. 
44 J Wood ‘You Can Get Fired for What You Say Online’ (2015) Moneybags 
<http://www.moneybags.co.za/article/can-get-fired-say-online/> (accessed 15 June 2016). 
45 E Bennington ‘Handling Employee Violation of your Social Media Policy’ <http://hiring.monster.com/hr/hr-
best-practices/small-business/social-media-trends/social-media-guidelines.aspx> (accessed 15 June 2016). 
46 T Angermair et al ‘Dismissal on Grounds of Employee Social Media Comments’ (2015) International Bar 
Association: Employment and Industrial Relations Law Committee Publications 
<http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=78137209-857a-48c6-a068-33454f18611b> 
(accessed 4 December 2016). 
47 R Davey & L Dahms-Jansen ‘Social Media and Strikes’ (2012) 12 (10) Without Prejudice 26. 
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It has also been stated that ‘dismissal cases involving social media have grown in numbers in 
recent times, increasing the need for courts and tribunals to apply the law in new and novel 
situations’.48  
 
Angermair et al state that one of the main problems that has emerged is whether or not the 
derogatory comments posted on social media are ‘severe enough to constitute grounds for 
dismissal’.49 The courts are therefore faced with deciding whether or not derogatory comments 
are sufficiently severe to warrant dismissal of the employee who made the comments on social 
media.50 
 
Apart from authors such as those cited above, judges have also started to make mention of the 
new problems to emerge with the recent rise in the use of social media as follows:  
 
Ramushowana J in the case of Fredericks v Jo Barkett Fashions51 acknowledged that ‘social 
media interaction is a new concept in the globe and it is growing very fast’.52 
 
In the case of Heroldt v Wills53 Willis J acknowledged that: 
 
‘[t]he social media, of which Facebook is a component, have created tensions for these rights 
in ways that could not have been foreseen by the Roman Emperor Justinian's legal team, the 
learned Dutch legal writers of the seventeenth century (“the old authorities”) or the founders 
of our Constitution’.54 
 
Social media communication has become a popular method of communicating one’s thoughts, 
opinions and feelings.55 Therefore, whether or not technology evolves further, and 
communication takes for example the form of holographic videos, our law56 will still need to 
keep up and be applicable to the times.  
                                                          
48 Fairwork Centre ‘Social Media and Unfair Dismissal’ <http://www.fairworkcentre.com.au/newsblog/Case-
Studies/Social-Media-and-Unfair-Dismissal/> (accessed 15 June 2016). 
49 Angermair et al (note 47 above). 
50 Case law on fair dismissals (note 37 above). 
51 2011 JOL 27923 (CCMA). 
52 Fredericks (note 31 above) para 6.3. 
53 2014 JOL 31479 (GSJ). 
54 Heroldt v Wills 2014 JOL 31479 (GSJ) para 7. 
55 Fredericks (note 31 above) para 6.3. 
56 LRA (note 1 above). 
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The development of technology may have impacted on the suitability of our current 
legislation57 to deal adequately with dismissals for derogatory comments posted by employees 
on social media. It is only fitting that our laws58 should be applicable to the times we are living 
in now. With the recent rise in the use of social media, it has now become necessary to 
determine whether or not our current Labour Relations Act59 is fit for purpose in relation to 
derogatory comments posted by employees on social media
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 AS IT RELATES TO 
DEROGATORY COMMENTS POSTED BY EMPLOYEES ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
3. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Having discussed the increase in dismissals for derogatory comments posted by employees on 
social media, this Chapter will turn to an analysis of the Labour Relations Act60 as it relates to 
derogatory comments posted by employees on social media. The Act61 cautions that ‘it is 
intentionally general [as] each case is unique, and departures from the norms established by 
this Code may be justified in proper circumstances’.62 
 
3.1     Factors and grounds employers should take into account when dismissing employees63 
The Act64 suggests factors that the employer should take into account when dismissing an 
employee65 which are:  
 
i. ‘the employee's circumstances (including length of service, previous disciplinary record 
and personal circumstances)’; 66 
ii. ‘the nature of the job’; 67 and  
iii. ‘the circumstances of the infringement itself’.68 
 
There are three grounds in terms of which an employer may dismiss an employee69 which are: 
 
i. ‘the conduct of the employee’;70 
ii. ‘the capacity of the employee’;71 and 
iii. ‘the operational requirements of the employer's business’.72 
                                                          
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 1(1). 
63 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 2(2) & 3(5). 
64 LRA (note 1 above). 
65 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(5). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 2(2). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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In relation to dismissals for derogatory comments posted by employees on social media the 
‘circumstances of the infringement’73 that the employer may take into account will be: 
 
i. the nature of the derogatory comment;  
ii. that the derogatory comment was posted on social media; and  
iii. the negative impact that the derogatory comment has had on the employer or business. 
 
Once the employer has taken the aforementioned factors74 into account, the employer may 
dismiss the employee for her conduct.75 To dismiss an employee on this ground76 it must be 
determined whether or not such conduct77 (the posting of derogatory comments on social 
media) amounts to misconduct78 in terms of the Act.79 
 
3.2     Misconduct80  
The Act81 does not define precisely what constitutes misconduct.82 The Act83 provides certain 
examples of serious misconduct such as:  
 
i. ‘dishonesty’;84 
ii. ‘wilful damage of the employer’s property’;85  
iii. ‘wilful endangering of the safety of others’;86  
iv. ‘physical assault on the employer, a fellow employee, client or customer’;87 and  
v. ‘gross insubordination’.88 
 
                                                          
73 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(5). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 2(2). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
79 LRA (note 1 above). 
80 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
81 LRA (note 1 above). 
82 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
83 LRA (note 1 above). 
84 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(4). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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The Act89 permits an employer to dismiss an employee for ‘misconduct that is serious and of 
such gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable’.90 The 
misconduct91 of the employee will be the cause; and the effect will be ‘the employment 
relationship becoming intolerable’.92 This means that misconduct encompasses a breach of 
good faith.93 
 
The Act94 further provides a set of guidelines for determining whether or not dismissals for 
misconduct are fair.95  These guidelines96 refer to:  
 
i. whether or not the employee has contravened a workplace rule;97  
ii. whether or not the workplace rule was valid or reasonable;98  
iii. whether or not the employee was aware of the workplace rule;99  
iv. whether or not the workplace rule has been consistently applied;100 and  
v. whether or not dismissal was an appropriate sanction.101  
 
This means that for an employer to dismiss an employee for misconduct,102 the employee would 
have to have breached a workplace rule.103 Therefore, misconduct104 encompasses a breach of 
good faith105 as well as a breach of a workplace rule.106 These two concepts will be discussed 
in turn.
                                                          
89 LRA (note 1 above). 
90 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(4). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
94 LRA (note 1 above). 
95 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(a). 
98 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(i). 
99 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(ii). 
100 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iii). 
101 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iv). 
102 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
103 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
104 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
105 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
106 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
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3.3     Duty of good faith107 
3.3.1  Duty of good faith108 in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995109 
The Act110 states that ‘employers and employees should treat each other with mutual 
respect’.111  An employer may dismiss an employee for ‘misconduct that is serious and of such 
gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable’.112 The Act further states 
that ‘employers are entitled to satisfactory conduct and work performance from their 
employees’.113  In the workplace it is expected that employees will be on their best behaviour 
and that they will act in the best interests of their employer.114  
 
3.3.2  Duty of good faith in terms of the common law 
Toba states that:  
 
‘[t]he power of the employer to regulate the conduct of an employee is to be found in the 
implied common law duties of the employees. In terms of the common law the employee 
has a duty to obey reasonable and lawful commands from his employer as well as the duty 
to perform his functions with due diligence and skill’.115 
 
In the case of National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa obo Tiou/ Vanchem Vanadium 
Products (Pty) Ltd116 the court held that: 
  
‘[i]t is well established that the relationship between employer and employee is in essence one 
of trust and confidence and that at common law conduct clearly inconsistent therewith 
entitles the innocent party to cancel the agreement’.117 
 
It is therefore clear that the employer must be able to trust that the employee will not conduct 
herself in a manner that is contrary to the employment contract.118
                                                          
107 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
108 Ibid.  
109 LRA (note 1 above). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 1(3). 
112 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(4). 
113 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 1(3). 
114 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
115 W, Toba, ‘Substantive fairness of dismissal for misconduct’ (2004) University of Port Elizabeth 7. 
116 2015 (5) BALR 525 (MEIBC). 
117 National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa obo Tiou/ Vanchem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd 2015 (5) 
BALR 525 (MEIBC) para 26. 
118 Ibid. 
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The court in the case of National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa obo Zulu / GUD 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd,119 held that ‘in terms of the common law an employee is obliged to act in 
the interests of his employer and not against it’.120 This implies that an employee should not 
make derogatory comments about the employer.121 If an employee makes derogatory 
comments about the employer, then this will not be in the best interests of the employer as it 
may place the employer in a bad light; and may tarnish the employer’s reputation.122 
 
3.3.3  Analysis of the duty of good faith123 as it relates to derogatory comments posted on social 
media 
According to Oosthuizen:  
 
‘[e]mployees may not be aware of the duty of good faith that they owe to their employer and 
by posting a defamatory statement on social media in frustration or in an attempt to be 
humorous, it will be a breach of that duty’.124 
 
The posting of derogatory comments about one’s employer is similar to gossiping orally to the 
public about the employer. The difference between gossiping orally and posting comments on 
social media is that oral gossip may be difficult to prove in court because of the rule against 
hearsay evidence, whereas comments posted on social media are in writing and are therefore 
easy to prove in court.  
 
Gossiping may cause a relationship to sour when the person being gossiped about finds out 
what was being said about her. In the same way, the posting of derogatory comments on social 
media may damage the employment relationship when the employer finds out about the 
derogatory post on social media.125 Therefore, depending on the circumstances this may 
amount to a breach of good faith.126 
                                                          
119 2015 (12) BALR 1306 (DRC). 
120 National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa obo Zulu / GUD Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2015 (12) BALR 1306 
(DRC) para 37. 
121 Ibid. 
122 See Sedick (note 138 below) para 53; National Union of Food (note 161 below) para 16; and Fredericks (note 
31 above) para 4.1. (Employers’ reputation). 
123 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
124 V Oosthuizen ‘Social Networking: A New Form of Misconduct?’ (2011) Professional Accountant 19. 
125 Case law on fair dismissals (note 37 above). 
126 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
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The court in the case of Costa/Nu Metro Theatres127 held that:  
 
‘[i]t is now established law that an employee may be disciplined for misconduct that takes 
place outside working hours provided the misconduct negatively impacts on the employment 
relationship’.128 
 
Most employees do not realise that the duty of good faith129 may sometimes extend beyond the 
workplace.130 It is submitted that an employee should not exhibit a kind of ‘split personality’ 
by being faithful to her employer in the workplace and then by being deceitful to her employer 
by posting derogatory comments on social media. Although the posting of derogatory 
comments on social media may have occurred outside the workplace and in the personal time 
of the employee, that comment may still reach the employer and may hinder the working 
relationship.131  
 
It is therefore submitted that it does not matter whether or not the derogatory comment was 
posted on social media within the workplace during working hours; or outside the workplace 
after hours,132 as it will still amount to misconduct;133 and a breach of good faith.134 
 
The case of Sedick and another/ Krisay (Pty) Ltd135  serves as an example as to how the court 
has deliberated on the concept of good faith,136 by determining whether or not dismissal was 
fair for derogatory comments posted by employees on social media. In this case, employees 
were charged with ‘bringing the company’s name into disrepute by posting derogatory 
statements in the public domain’.137  
 
Although the name of the company and employer were not explicitly stated on the employees’ 
Facebook page, the public would still have been able to make the connection.138 
                                                          
127 2005 (10) BALR 1018 (BCEISA). 
128 Costa/Nu Metro Theatres 2005 (10) BALR 1018 (BCEISA) 1027. 
129 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
130 Costa/Nu Metro Theatres (note 129 above) 1027. 
131 Case law on fair dismissals (note 37 above). 
132 Costa/Nu Metro Theatres (note 129 above) 1027. 
133 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
134 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
135 2011 (8) BLLR 979 (CCMA). 
136 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
137 Sedick and another/ Krisay (Pty) Ltd 2011 (8) BLLR 979 (CCMA) para 12. 
138 Ibid., para 29. 
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The employer stated that the employees’ posts on Facebook were serious enough to warrant 
dismissal because of the following factors:  
 
i. the employees represented the company;139  
ii. the employees had dealings with customers and suppliers;140  
iii. the comments posted on Facebook could be accessed by anyone;141 and  
iv. the comments encouraged participation from other employees.142 
 
Bennet J stated that ‘the ever-increasing access to and use of the Internet has been, and 
continues to be, both a blessing and a curse to businesses worldwide’.143 The blessing refers to 
employers being able to advance their business through the use of social media by way of 
adverts, promotions and the like.  
 
The curse refers to employees of the business taking to social media, to post derogatory 
comments about their employer which may tarnish the reputation of the employer or businesses 
among its clients, suppliers, investors and competitors.144 In this case, Bennet J took into 
account the reputation of the company being tarnished in the eyes of customers and 
competitors; as well as the employees’ lack of respect for their employer.145 
 
Bennet J assessed the content of the comments posted on social media by taking into account 
the following factors:  
 
i. ‘the circumstances - what was written’;146  
ii. ‘where the comments were posted’;147  
iii. ‘to whom they were directed’;148  
iv. ‘to whom they were available’;149 and  
v. ‘by whom they were said’.150
                                                          
139 Ibid., para 34. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid., para 45. 
144 Employers’ reputation (note 123 above). 
145 Sedick (note 138 above) para 53. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid.  
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
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In reaching his judgment, Bennet J took into account the following factors:   
 
i. privacy;151   
ii. the content of the comments posted on social media;152  
iii. the circumstances surrounding the comments posted on social media;153  
iv. the breach of good faith by taking into account the employer’s reputation;154 and  
v. whether or not the work relationship has become intolerable.155  
 
It was concluded that the dismissal of the employees was fair.156 Although Bennet J adequately 
assessed whether or not there had been a breach of good faith,157 the judge ‘with respect’ did 
not assess whether or not there had been a breach of a workplace rule.158 
 
In the case of National Union of Food, Beverage, Wine, Spirits and Allied Workers Union obo 
Arendse v Consumer Brands Business Worcester, a Division of Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd159an 
employee was dismissed for breaching his employer’s IT (Information Technology) policy by 
posting derogatory comments on Facebook about his employer.160 The employee cited the right 
to privacy161 as a defence against being dismissed for derogatory comments posted on social 
media.162 
 
De Vlieger-Seynhaeve J held that dismissal would be fair with regard to ‘critical comments 
placed on Facebook’163 by implementing the following three-stage test: 
 
i. ‘where an employee fails to restrict access to the site’;164 
ii. ‘where the posting brings the employer into disrepute’;165 and
                                                          
151 Ibid., para 50. 
152 Ibid., para 53. 
153 Ibid.  
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid.  
157 Ibid.  
158 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, item 7. 
159 2014 (7) BALR 716 (CCMA). 
160 National Union of Food, Beverage, Wine, Spirits and Allied Workers Union obo Arendse v Consumer Brands 
Business Worcester, a Division of Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2014 (7) BALR 716 (CCMA) para 3. 
161 Constitution (note 5 above) s 14. 
162 National Union of Food (note 161 above) para 16. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
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iii. ‘where the posting leads to the working relationship becoming intolerable’.166 
 
However, the test in determining whether or not the dismissal was fair for the derogatory 
comments posted by the employee was not followed.167 De Vlieger-Seynhaeve J ‘with respect’ 
only implemented the first leg of the test and held that the dismissal was fair because the 
employee had failed to restrict access to his Facebook account.168 
 
It is submitted that it should have been determined whether or not the derogatory comment 
posted on social media was a breach of good faith169 by assessing whether or not the employee 
had brought the employer’s name into disrepute;170 and more importantly whether or not the 
derogatory comments posted on social media had in fact led to the working relationship 
becoming intolerable.171 By not following the proposed three-step test,172 De Vlieger-
Seynhaeve J ‘with respect’ undermined the importance of determining whether or not there had 
been a breach of good faith173 between the employee and employer. 
 
In the case of Dauth/Brown and Weir’s Cash and Carry,174 the court held that: 
 
‘[t]he employer’s attitude to the misconduct and its effect on the relationship must be taken 
into account, although it is not always necessarily the deciding factor and in the final analysis 
it is a judgment call that must be made by the judge or arbitrator’.175 
 
From the aforementioned case, the court averred that the effect of the employee’s misconduct 
on the employment relationship may not be the only factor in determining whether or not 
dismissal is fair.176 This implies that there may be another factor177 in addition to the breach of 
good faith factor178 to determine whether or not dismissal for misconduct179 is fair. 
                                                          
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid., para 17. 
168 Ibid. 
169 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
170 National Union of Food (note 161 above) para 16. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
174 2002 (8) BALR 837 (CCMA). 
175 Dauth/Brown and Weir’s Cash and Carry 2002 (8) BALR 837 (CCMA) 847. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
179 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
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When making a final decision as to whether or not dismissal for misconduct180 is fair, a judge 
may take into account an additional factor181 which is whether or not there has been a breach 
of a workplace rule.182 
 
3.4     Workplace rule183 
3.4.1  Workplace rule184 in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995185 
The Act186 advises that ‘all employers should adopt disciplinary rules that establish the standard 
of conduct required of their employees’.187 The Act188 acknowledges that ‘the form and content 
of disciplinary rules will obviously vary according to the size and nature of the employer’s 
business’.189 
 
In addition, the Act190 provides a set of guidelines for determining whether or not dismissals 
for misconduct are fair.191 According to this set of guidelines it must be determined:  
 
a. ‘whether or not the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating conduct in, or of 
relevance to, the workplace’; and192 
b. ‘if a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not’;193  
i. ‘the rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard’;194 
ii. ‘the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have been aware, of the rule 
or standard’;195 
iii. ‘the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer’;196 and 
iv. ‘dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of the rule or standard’.197
                                                          
180 Ibid.  
181 Dauth/Brown (note 176 above) 847. 
182 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, item 7. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 LRA (note 1 above). 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(1). 
188 LRA (note 1 above). 
189 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(1). 
190 LRA (note 1 above). 
191 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
192 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(a). 
193 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b). 
194 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(i). 
195 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(ii). 
196 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iii). 
197 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iv). 
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3.4.2  Workplace rule in terms of the common law 
In the case of Hoch v Mustek Electronics (Pty) Ltd198 the court held that ‘it is for the employer 
to set standards of conduct for its employees’199 while the court in the case of Costa/Nu Metro 
Theatres200 held that ‘as a general rule, misconduct implies breach of a valid workplace 
rule’.201  Toba explains that ‘misconduct could be described as any act or omission on the part 
of the employee not in conformity with the set guidelines, standards, rules and policies of the 
workplace’.202 
 
This means that an employer may dismiss an employee for misconduct203 if there has been a 
breach of a workplace rule.204  However the Act205 goes beyond this common law requirement 
by providing a set of model guidelines or questions that a court should take into account when 
determining whether or not dismissal is fair206 for breach of a workplace rule.207 
 
3.4.3  Analysis of the workplace rule208 as it relates to derogatory comments posted on social 
media 
3.4.3.1  Dismissals where there are workplace rules209 in place 
In a situation where there is a workplace rule210 in place and the employer dismisses an 
employee for posting derogatory comments on social media, the employer must take into 
account the following factors:  
 
i. whether or not the employee has contravened a workplace rule;211  
ii. whether or not the workplace rule was valid or reasonable;212  
iii. whether or not the employee was aware of the workplace rule;213 
                                                          
198 1999 (12) BLLR 1287 (LC). 
199 Hoch v Mustek Electronics (Pty) Ltd 1999 (12) BLLR 1287 (LC) para 41. 
200 2005 (10) BALR 1018 (BCEISA). 
201 Costa/Nu Metro Theatres (note 129 above) 1026. 
202 Toba (note 116 above) 3. 
203 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
204 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
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207 Ibid.  
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
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iv. whether or not the workplace rule has been consistently applied;214 and 
v. whether or not dismissal was an appropriate sanction.215  
 
Answering in the affirmative to each of the propositions put forward will mean that the 
dismissal was fair.216 A few of the above propositions will be discussed in relation to case law. 
 
3.4.3.2  Determination as to whether or not a workplace rule has been contravened217 
In determining whether or not the employee contravened a workplace rule pertaining to social 
media misconduct,218 the court in the case of Page/Edcon Group Employee Relations Dept219 
held that the term ‘monkey’ uttered by an employee was not derogatory.220 In making a 
decision, Grobler J followed a three-step test by taking into account the following factors: 
 
i. ‘does the usage of the word in context amount to abusive, insulting and derogatory   
language in terms of the disciplinary code’;221  
ii. ‘does it justify the sanction of dismissal in the circumstances?’;222 and  
iii. ‘has there been a breakdown in the trust of employment relationship?’.223  
 
Grobler J further indicated that ‘a chairperson can’t conclude that an employment relationship 
has broken down –it has to be proved’.224 This case looked at whether or not the employee had 
contravened a workplace rule225 pertaining to derogatory language uttered by the employee.226  
 
Grobler J ‘with respect’ did not however, take into account the following factors:  
 
i. whether or not the workplace rule was valid or reasonable;227  
ii. whether or not the employee was aware of the rule;228 and 
                                                          
214 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iii). 
215 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iv). 
216 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
217 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(a). 
218 Ibid. 
219 2006 (6) BALR 632 (CCMA). 
220 Page/Edcon Group Employee Relations Dept 2006 (6) BALR 632 (CCMA) 642.    
221 Ibid., 635. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid., 643. 
225 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, item 7. 
226 Page/Edcon (note 221 above) 635. 
227 LRA (note 1 above) Schedule 8, item 7(b)(i). 
228 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(ii). 
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iii. whether or not the workplace rule had been consistently applied in terms of the model 
guidelines229 set by the Act.230 
 
3.4.3.3  Determination as to whether or not the workplace rule was valid or reasonable231 
In determining whether or not the workplace rule was valid or reasonable,232 the case of 
Pillay/Rennies Distribution Services233 referred to the international case of Atlantis Diesel 
Engines (Pty) Ltd v Roux NO234 which provided the following twofold test: ‘was the rule 
reasonably related to’:235  
 
i. ‘the orderly, efficient and safe operation of the company’s business’; 236 and  
ii. ‘the performance that the company might properly expect of the employee?’.237 
 
This test does not necessarily indicate how workplace rules238 relating to derogatory comments 
posted on social media may be validly formulated.239 A workplace rule240 prohibiting the 
posting of derogatory comments on social media may not necessarily be aimed at facilitating 
‘the orderly, efficient and safe operation of the business’;241 it may however be aimed at 
protecting the reputation of the employer.242 
 
3.4.3.4  Determination as to whether or not dismissal was an appropriate sanction243 
 In determining ‘whether or not dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of 
the rule or standard’,244 the court in the case of UASA obo Jones/Commuter Transport 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd245 held that ‘the company is entitled to impose a sanction of dismissal in 
                                                          
229 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iii). 
230 LRA (note 1 above). 
231 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(i). 
232 Ibid. 
233 Pillay/Rennies Distribution Services 2007 (2) BALR 174 (CCMA)181. 
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239 Pillay/Rennies (note 234 above) 181. 
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terms of its disciplinary code’246 and therefore cannot ‘interfere with the discretion of the 
company in this regard’.247 
 
If there is a legally valid workplace rule248 prohibiting an employee from making derogatory 
comments on social media, the sanction of dismissal must still be appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
 
3.4.3.5  Dismissals where there are no workplace rules249 in place 
The reality is that many employers do not adopt their own set of rules for employees to 
follow.250 This becomes a problem when employers dismiss employees for derogatory 
comments posted on social media and there is no workplace rule251 prohibiting such conduct. 
According to the Act252 misconduct253 implies breach of a workplace rule254and a breach of 
good faith.255  
 
In the absence of a workplace rule256 employers will have to establish that there has been a 
breach of good faith.257 This is because the Act258 does not make specific provision for a 
situation or situations where an employer may dismiss an employee in the absence of a 
workplace rule.259 
 
Many employers have not taken the step of setting their own rules regarding social media 
misconduct,260as they are unaware that the posting of derogatory comments by employees on 
social media could become a serious issue.261 The issue of social media only comes to light 
when it personally affects the employer; and the employee is then faced with a dismissal.262 It 
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is then left to the courts to determine whether or not dismissal is fair in the absence of a 
workplace rule263 prohibiting the posting of derogatory comments on social media.264  
 
The case of Fredericks v Jo Barkett Fashions265 serves as an example of how the court has 
determined whether or not dismissal was fair in a situation where there was no workplace rule 
in place. In this case, the employer was informed that the employee was posting derogatory 
comments about her on Facebook.266  
 
The employer went on to the employee’s Facebook page and found derogatory comments made 
about the employer.267 The employer stated that the derogatory comments had a negative 
impact on other employees and customers which may result in a loss of revenue for the 
company.268 The employee cited the right to privacy269 as a defence against dismissal for 
posting derogatory comments on social media; and further stated that such dismissal was unfair 
and too harsh a sanction.270 
 
In making a decision as to whether or not dismissal was fair, Ramushowana J assessed whether 
or not the employee had breached a workplace rule.271 Ramushowana J followed the guidelines 
in item 7 of the Labour Relations Act272 to determine whether or not the dismissal for 
misconduct was fair.273 It was clear that there was no workplace rule274 prohibiting the posting 
of derogatory comments on social media.275  
 
The employer stated that the employee had, however, contravened provisions of the 
employment contract.276 Ramushowana J relied on the employee’s admission that she had 
committed the offence277 in determining that the dismissal was fair.278 Ramushowana J 
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deliberated that the employee’s privacy had not been infringed.279 A proper interrogation and 
analysis of whether or not the derogatory comments posted on Facebook amounted to social 
media misconduct was not undertaken.  
 
As there was no workplace rule prohibiting the posting of derogatory comments on social 
media,280 Ramushowana J ‘with respect’ did not assess whether or not the employer had 
dismissed the employee on the basis of misconduct281 which is inclusive of a breach of good 
faith,282 as provided for in the Labour Relations Act.283 The judgement was therefore one 
dimensional as it did not take into account the applicability of the Labour Relations Act284 as 
it relates to social media misconduct.   
 
3.4.3.6  Impairment of dignity 
In the case of Steenberg / Liebherr-Africa (Pty) Ltd.285Panellist J stated that:  
 
‘[i]t is further trite that the use of derogatory or abusive language invariably impairs the 
dignity of those against whom the language is directed, whether directly or indirectly, and it 
is not even necessary for offences in this regard to be codified’.286 
 
In the case of Costa/Nu Metro Theatres287 the court found that the employee was fairly 
dismissed for making defamatory comments against his co-workers which were untrue.288 The 
court held that even if there is not a specific policy prohibiting derogatory comments, the 
employee is obliged to respect the dignity of others.289 
 
Generally speaking for an employee to be guilty of misconduct290 she would have to have 
breached a workplace rule.291 But according to the above-mentioned cases, if an action is 
serious enough to impair the dignity of a co-worker or employer, (discussed in Chapter 5)  it is 
                                                          
279 Ibid., para 6.3. 
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obvious that this amounts to misconduct292 and a workplace rule293 is not needed in this 
instance.294 It is submitted that it is preferable for employers to remove all uncertainty in such 
cases by formulating a suitable workplace rule295 prohibiting derogatory comments being 
posted on social media. 
 
3.5     Summary of findings 
After analysing the various provisions of the Labour Relations Act296 it is clear that certain 
provisions in the Labour Relations Act297 may still be applied to dismissals for derogatory 
comments posted by employees on social media. 
 
Item 3(5) of Schedule 8 of the Act298 may be still be applied and adjusted according to the 
factors299 that the employer should take into account when dismissing an employee for 
derogatory comments posted on social media. 
 
Item 2(2) of Schedule 8 of the Act300 lists ‘the conduct of the employee’ as one of the grounds301 
for dismissal. This ground302 will still apply to dismissals for derogatory comments posted on 
social media. This is because the act of posting a derogatory comment on social media amounts 
to conduct on the part of an employee. 
 
If the employer dismisses the employee on this ground303 in terms of the Act304 it must be 
determined whether or not such conduct305 (the posting of derogatory comments on social 
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media) amounts to misconduct306 in terms of the Act.307 As explained above, misconduct308 
encompasses a breach of good faith309as well as a breach of a workplace rule.310 
 
3.5.1  Breach of good faith311 requires a ‘subjective test’ 
The concept of breach of good faith312 is a ‘subjective test’ that the courts will take into account 
when determining whether or not dismissals for misconduct313 are fair. The factors that the 
courts will take into account are as follows: 
 
i. the reputation of the employer;314  
ii. the working relationship becoming intolerable;315  
iii. the consequences of the misconduct;316 and 
iv. a number of other factors depending on the situation of the case. 
 
3.5.2  Breach of a workplace rule317 requires an ‘objective test’ 
The breach of a workplace rule318 is an ‘objective test’ that the courts will take into account in 
the form of a ‘check list’319 in terms of the Act.320  The factors that the courts will take into 
account are as follows:  
 
i. whether or not the employee has contravened a workplace rule;321 
ii. whether or not the workplace rule was valid or reasonable;322  
iii. whether or not the employee was aware of the workplace rule;323  
iv. whether or not the workplace rule has been consistently applied;324 and  
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v. whether or not dismissal was an appropriate sanction.325 
 
It is submitted that both the concepts of good faith326 and the workplace rule327 are still valid 
and applicable in determining whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments posted on 
social media are fair. This is because misconduct328 entails a ‘subjective test’ (breach of good 
faith329) and an ‘objective test’ (breach of a workplace rule330) which if co-applied will 
adequately determine whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social 
media are fair. 
 
3.5.3  Shortcomings in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
The following provisions of the Act331 have not kept pace with social media and problems have 
arisen in applying the current legislation332 to dismissals for derogatory comments posted on 
social media: 
 
The Act333 does not provide a definition of misconduct334 nor does it provide a definition of 
social media misconduct. The Act335 provides a few examples of serious misconduct,336 but it 
does not provide social media misconduct as an example. Since social media misconduct is not 
listed as an example of serious misconduct,337 this may lead to uncertainty in determining 
whether or not the Act338 may be applied to this new phenomenon of social media and more 
specifically to dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media.  
 
3.5.4  Shortcomings in court decisions 
In analysing the cases, it seems that the courts have become side tracked by issues such as the 
right to privacy339 (discussed in Chapter 6) in determining whether or not dismissals for 
                                                          
325 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7(b)(iv). 
326 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
327 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
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334 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 3(4), 3(5), 3(6) & 7. 
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336 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 3(4). 
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338 LRA (note 1 above). 
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derogatory comments posted on social media are fair. The courts have also been inconsistent 
in applying the concept of breach of good faith340 and breach of the workplace rule341 to 
determine whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media are fair.  
 
In the case of Fredericks342 the court only applied the objective test of determining whether or 
not there had been a breach of a workplace rule343 but did not determine the subjective test of 
whether or not there had been a breach of good faith.344 
 
In the cases of Sedick345and National Union of Food346 the court applied only the subjective 
test of determining whether or not there had been a breach of good faith347 but did not determine 
the objective test of whether or not there had been a breach of a workplace rule.348 
 
The breach of the workplace rule349 is an important factor that the courts should take into 
account because it is an objective assessment that will determine whether or not dismissals for 
derogatory comments posted on social media are fair. The workplace rule350 would generally 
be a rule prohibiting the employees from posting derogatory comments on social media. It is 
therefore submitted that this workplace rule351 may take the form of a social media policy which 
businesses may implement in the workplace.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DESIRABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESSES ENACTING A SOCIAL 
MEDIA POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
4. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Having discussed the Labour Relations Act352 as it relates to derogatory comments posted on 
social media, this chapter will discuss the desirability of businesses enacting a social media 
policy. This social media policy may act as the workplace rule353 that businesses are advised 
to formulate in terms of the Act.354 According to Recalde ‘employers are advised to adopt a 
clear, written and detailed social media policy’.355 
 
Mushwana and Bezuidenhout state that:  
 
‘[i]n order to balance the benefits and risks associated with employees making use of social 
media, employers have an obligation to put in place policies and processes that protect their 
assets and reputations against any form of damage as [a] result of the actions of employees. 
This includes the implementation and practical application of a social media policy, training 
employees on its scope and impact, and enforcing the policy’.356 
 
4.1     Reasons why many businesses have not enacted a social media policy 
According to Mushwana and Bezuidenhout ‘the absence of policies guiding social media usage 
might have arisen because social media policy is perceived to be ineffective and a lesser priority 
in addressing social media risk’.357  
 
However, in the same way that businesses are advised to keep up with technological advances 
such as computers, cell phones, software and the like; they should also keep up with the use of 
social media by enacting a social media policy which prohibits employees from posting 
derogatory comments about the employer or business on social media. 
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Many businesses have jumped on the social media bandwagon in the interests of promoting 
their products, services and company image. Today, many businesses have a Facebook page, a 
Twitter account, an Instagram account and the like. If businesses are able to reap the benefits 
of social media, then they should take into account the advantages of enacting a social media 
policy. 
 
4.2     Advantages of enacting a social media policy 
Dismissal of an employee will be justified if there is a proper social media policy in place as a 
workplace rule358 and the employee has breached it.  The social media policy will serve to 
protect the reputation of the employer or business in the eyes of customers, suppliers, investors 
and competitors on social media.359 It will provide clear guidance to employees on what 
conduct is acceptable; what conduct is not acceptable on social media; and the consequences 
thereof. 
 
LaPlaca and Winkeller state that:  
 
‘[a] social media policy will go a long way to help the employer avoid costly legal problems 
and other associated risks arising from situations that are otherwise beyond the employer’s 
immediate control’.360   
 
Although a social media policy may provide certain advantages for businesses as mentioned 
above, certain disadvantages may also arise from enacting a social media policy. 
 
4.3     Disadvantages of enacting a social media policy 
One disadvantage is that the social media policy may act as a quasi-legal code which employees 
may view as less binding than statutory legislation.361 It would also mean added costs for 
employers in having to hire an attorney to draft a social media policy.   
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Furthermore, the social media policy has to be current and applicable to the conduct of 
employees without limiting or infringing on their rights to freedom of expression362 (discussed 
in Chapter 5) and privacy363 (discussed in Chapter 6). It will, therefore, have to be updated on 
a regular basis, in order to keep up with the constantly changing social media platforms. 
 
After assessing the risks of not enacting a social media policy, as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages of enacting a social media policy, it is worth assessing the manner in which a 
social media policy may be implemented. 
 
4.4     Manner in which a social media policy may be implemented  
According to Herlle and Astray-Caneda the policy should be coupled with training and 
monitoring.364 One of the factors that the Act365 lists in determining whether or not dismissal 
for misconduct366 was fair, is whether or not the employee was aware of the workplace rule.367 
Enacting a social media policy as a workplace rule368 goes hand in hand with educating the 
employees about the workplace rule and the consequences of breaching the workplace rule.369 
 
Schoeman proposes that as a solution to social media misconduct ‘broad based leadership is 
needed to build and maintain high levels of ethical awareness and to continually strive to build 
commitment to common values such as integrity and respect’.370 This will ensure that there is 
good faith371 between the employee and employer. 
 
Along with the social media policy, employers should stress the importance and the reason for 
the workplace rule372 being enacted. It is important that employees know that they also have a 
duty to respect their employer.373 One of the ways to carry out that respect is to refrain from 
posting derogatory comments about the employer on social media. 
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Shinn states that:  
 
‘[e]mployers barely have the time to continuously monitor normal business operations for 
employee misconduct. So, to add policing off-duty on social media employee conduct is a 
burden that most employers are not excited to undertake, nor want to’.374  
 
Employers do not have to constantly monitor the internet to establish whether or not their 
employees have posted derogatory comments on social media.  Instead, employers should place 
their reliance on a social media policy, which will serve as a fair reason for dismissal when it 
does come to the employer’s attention that an employee has posted a derogatory comment 
about the employer/ business on social media.  
 
In South Africa, the government has enacted a social media policy that serves as a set of social 
media guidelines for government employees. This is an example of a social media policy which 
is, perhaps, suited to South African conditions.  
 
4.5     An example of a social media policy suited to South African conditions  
The Social Media Policy Guidelines375 drafted by the South African Government recognises 
that:  
 
‘[t]here is a phenomenal growth in digital technology and the rise of social media platforms 
over the past few years have revolutionised the way in which people communicate and share 
information’.376 
 
The purpose of the policy is:  
 
‘[t]o create an awareness of social media and the opportunities it presents for government and 
to make government agencies and government staff aware of how to manage the risks 
associated with the use of social media’.377
                                                          
374 J Shinn ‘Employee Fired for Facebook Postings Latest Example for Why Companies Need a Social Media 
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The Social Media Policy Guidelines recognise that there has been a rise in communication via 
social media and provides a set of guidelines on how government employees may manage the 
risks of using social media.378 The government has taken the step to safeguard against the risk 
of the use of social media by government employees.379  
 
‘The government has provided that when contributing on behalf of the government and/or 
department, government employees should consider the following’:380 
  
i. ‘Keep your postings legal, ethical and respectful’.381 
ii. ‘Respect copyright laws’.382 
iii. ‘Ensure that information published online is accurate and approved’.383 
iv. ‘Comply with your department’s spokesperson policy’.384 
 
The government has further provided that ‘when using social media at personal capacity, 
employees should consider the following;’385 
 
i. ‘Keep government- confidential information confidential’.386 
ii. ‘Keep personal social media activities distinct from government communication’.387 
iii. ‘Respect government time and property’.388 
 
Lastly ‘when using any type of social media’, the government has indicated that government 
employees must:389 
 
i. ‘Be credible- accurate, fair, thorough and transparent’.390 
ii. ‘Be respectful-encourage constructive criticism and deliberation’.391 
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iii. ‘Be cordial honest and professional at all times’.392 
iv. ‘Listen before you talk- before entering any conversation you need to understand the 
context, who is the potential audience? is there a good reason to place a comment or 
respond’?393 
v. ‘Write what you know- you have to know your facts and cite credible sources’.394 
vi. ‘Acknowledge if a mistake is made through your comment or response and respond to it 
immediately’.395 
vii. ‘Be both reactive and responsive- when you gain insight share it where appropriate’.396 
 
The implementation of a social media policy by the government should inspire businesses in 
the private sector to follow in the steps of the government by also implementing a social media 
policy to safeguard against the risks of the use of social media by its employees. 
 
After assessing, the advantages and disadvantages of enacting a social media policy; how the 
social media policy may be implemented; and an example of a social media policy, it is 
necessary to assess the risks of not implementing a social media policy. 
 
4.6     Risks of not implementing a social media policy 
A study conducted by Mushwana and Bezuidenhout revealed that social media is a risk, and a 
majority of organisations which they surveyed had not implemented a social media policy.397 
This is evident in the increase in the number of cases that have arisen which pertain to the 
dismissals of employees for derogatory comments posted on social media in the absence of a 
social media policy prohibiting such conduct.398 
 
Businesses that fail to enact a social media policy run the risk of employees casting the business 
or employer in a bad light.399 Posts on social media enter the public domain and can be accessed 
by anyone at any time.400  This could negatively impact on the business when people read and 
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believe the derogatory comments posted on social media which could lead to a decrease in 
sales, a loss of profit and investors withdrawing their investments from businesses.  
 
Thompson and Bluvshtein state that ‘the increase in the use of social media and technology by 
employees has resulted in an increase in cases of misuse and ultimately in litigation’.401 
 
It is obvious that employees are not permitted to use social media in the workplace as it would 
hinder their performance.  The misuse of social media occurs when employees use social media 
to post derogatory comments about their employer on social media regardless of whether it was 
done within or outside the workplace.402 
 
Along with the risks of businesses not implementing a social media policy, there are tensions 
in our law that have been created by the rise of social media. These tensions arise when 
employees often cite constitutional rights such as the right to freedom of expression403 and the 
right to privacy404 as a defence against being dismissed for derogatory comments posted on 
social media. Each defence will be discussed in brief in Chapter 5 and the discussion is limited 
to potential areas of concern that are relevant to the main argument. 
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CHAPTER 5  
ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AS IT RELATES TO 
DEROGATORY COMMENTS POSTED BY EMPLOYEES ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
5. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Having discussed the desirability of businesses enacting a social media policy, this dissertation 
will turn to the manner in which certain constitutional rights inform and impact upon debates 
in this area. The purpose of discussing these constitutional rights is to determine whether or 
not the right to freedom of expression405 and the right to privacy406 are satisfactory defences 
against dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media. 
 
In the case of Heroldt v Wills407 Willis J stated that the founders of our Constitution could not 
have foreseen the tensions that social media have created for the rights to freedom of speech 
and privacy.408  These tensions refer to the employee citing the right to freedom of expression409 
and the right to privacy410 (discussed in Chapter 6) as defences against being dismissed for 
derogatory comments posted on social media.  
 
The right to freedom of expression411 and the right to privacy412 are provided for in the South 
African Constitution. People often believe that these rights extend to social media which they 
use as a platform to exercise their right to freedom of expression413 and right to privacy.414  As 
a defence against being dismissed for derogatory comments posted on social media, an 
employee may argue that she has the right to freedom of expression.415 
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5.1     Laws on freedom of expression in South Africa416  
An employee cites the right to freedom of expression417 from the South African Constitution 
which is used as a defence against dismissal for derogatory comments posted on social media.  
Section 16 of the Constitution states that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression 
which includes’:418  
 
i. ‘freedom of the press and other media’;419  
ii. ‘freedom to receive or impart information or ideas’;420  
iii. ‘freedom of artistic creativity’;421 and  
iv. ‘academic freedom and freedom of scientific research’.422 
 
In terms of section 16(2) of the Constitution, the right to freedom of expression423 does not 
extend to the following:  
 
i. ‘propaganda for war’;424  
ii. ‘incitement of imminent violence’;425 or 
iii. ‘advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm’.426 
 
Various judges of the Constitutional Court and authors have explained the meaning and the 
importance of the right to freedom of expression427 as follows: 
 
In the case of South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another428 
O’Regan J explained that:
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‘[f]reedom of expression lies at the heart of a democracy. It is valuable for many reasons, 
including its instrumental function as a guarantor of democracy, its implicit recognition and 
protection of the moral agency of individuals in our society and its facilitation of the search 
for truth by individuals and society generally. The Constitution recognises that individuals 
in our society need to be able to hear, form and express opinions and views freely on a wide 
range of matters’.429 
 
In the case of Democratic Alliance v ANC and Another430 the court held that the right to 
freedom of expression:431 
 
‘[i]s valuable both for its intrinsic importance and because it is instrumentally useful. It is 
useful in protecting democracy, by informing citizens, encouraging debate and enabling folly 
and misgovernance to be exposed. It also helps the search for truth by both individuals and 
society generally. If society represses views it considers unacceptable they may never be 
exposed as wrong. Open debate enhances truth-finding and enables us to scrutinise political 
argument and deliberate social values’.432   
 
Papadopoulos and Snail state that ‘freedom of opinion and expression is widely acknowledged 
as a human basic right that should be available to all as it plays a crucial role in fair and open 
society’.433  
 
With the meaning and importance of the right to freedom of expression434 borne in mind it is 
necessary to hone in on the right to freedom of expression435 by analysing it in relation to 
derogatory comments posted by employees on social media. 
   
5.2     Analysis of the right to freedom of expression436 as it relates to derogatory comments 
posted on social media 
In analysing the right to freedom of expression437 as it relates to derogatory comments posted 
on social media, Davey acknowledges that:
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‘[i]n today’s world the most effective, efficient and immediate way of conveying one’s ideas 
and thoughts is via the internet. At the same time, the internet reaches out to millions of 
people instantaneously’.438 
 
Papadopoulos and Snail state that ‘the internet has become a key instrument for communication 
and for exercising the right to freedom of expression in the form of writing, audio or video’.439 
Forms of social media like Twitter, Instagram and Facebook have become instruments for users 
to post their thoughts or comments on their social media profile.  
 
Nel states that ‘freedom of speech is a treasured human right in most democracies and in the 
process of communicating via any social network a user is exercising his right to freedom of 
speech’.440  Previously, people were limited to oral speech, writing or using the media to convey 
their political thoughts and opinions. Now people are able to post their political thoughts and 
opinions instantly on social media which is seen on the news feed of their friends and followers. 
 
It is submitted that the right to freedom of expression441 refers to opinions, thoughts, truths, 
debates and expressions in a political context.442 This right generally protects the democracy 
of the country by allowing people the freedom to express their thoughts and opinions about the 
government.443  
 
Freedom of expression444 in a political context, is still protected even if such thoughts or 
opinions are expressed on a platform of social media. However, the confusion comes in when 
people believe that freedom of expression445 extends to the freedom to express one’s thoughts 
or opinions in relation to anything or anyone on social media.446 
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This is a pivotal mistake that most employees make in believing that they have the freedom to 
post derogatory comments about their employer on social media.447 
 
In the political sphere, the right to freedom of expression448 is widely protected.  Once the right 
to freedom of expression449 enters a social sphere (by expressing one’s thoughts and opinions 
about another person), the scope of protection for the right to freedom of expression450 becomes 
narrower. This is because protection of the right to freedom of expression451 diminishes once 
it amounts to defamation. 
 
5.3     Analysis of the right to freedom of expression452 in terms of the common law 
5.3.1  Defamation 
Nel states that:  
 
‘[a]n individual’s right to freedom of speech includes the right to comment, but also the right 
to complain or “gripe.” However, as soon as the remarks (comments or complaints) referring 
to an individual (or business) are derogatory the poster of such remarks may be liable for 
defamation’.453  
 
Therefore, when an employee posts a derogatory comment about the employer on social media, 
that derogatory comment has the potential to cross the line of being insulting to actually 
injuring the reputation of the employer. In this instance, the employee may become liable for 
defamation. 
 
Although this dissertation is particularly focused on derogatory comments and not defamatory 
comments, it is important to look at how the two may become intertwined on a platform of 
social media.  A derogatory comment may or may not be defamatory but all defamatory 
statements are derogatory. Derogatory comments are ‘insulting, disrespectful, unflattering, 
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unkind, or demeaning’,454 whereas defamatory statements are not only insulting but also 
reputation damaging. 
 
It is worth noting that the freedom to post a derogatory comment on social media does not 
entail the absolute enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression.455 A derogatory comment 
metaphorically can be likened to a ‘person skating on the thin ice’. However, that person is 
heavy enough to break the ice and land in a ‘puddle of defamation’. If a comment falls into the 
category of defamation, the right to freedom of expression456 will be limited by the common 
law remedy of defamation. 
 
According to Truter:  
 
‘[d]efamation is the wrongful and intentional publication of defamatory words or conduct that 
refers to another person. The common law elements of defamation are: the wrongful and 
intentional publication of a defamatory statement concerning another person’.457 
 
5.3.2  Elements of defamation 
The derogatory comments posted by employees about their employer(s) on social media will 
be analysed in terms of the elements of defamation. 
 
5.3.2.1  Wrongfulness 
For a defamatory statement to be wrongful it must be contra boni-mores.458 This means that if 
a statement is found to be defamatory in the eyes of the community, such statement will be 
wrongful. In the context of a derogatory comment posted by an employee on social media, such 
comment is available in the public domain and is accessible to the public online.459 In 
cyberspace, people have a tendency to post comments that are controversial or comments that 
stir conversation on social media platforms.  
 
                                                          
454 Vocabulary.Com Dictionary (note 39 above). 
455 Constitution (note 5 above) s 16. 
456 Ibid., s 16. 
457 A Truter ‘Your Right of Recourse for Defamation of Character’ (2016) Schoeman Law Inc 
<https://www.schoemanlaw.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Your-right-to-recourse-for-defamation-of-
character-1.pdf> (accessed 29 June 2017). 
458 Ibid., 2. 
459 Sedick (note 138 above) paras 48 & 50. 
45 
 
Controversial comments posted by people on social media, are often derogatory comments 
posted by employees of their employer(s). By re-posting, republishing, re-tweeting and sharing 
the comment with other users on social media, attention is drawn to the derogatory comment 
which often indicates that such comment is wrongful. 
 
In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, it will be clear that it is this mobility of comments posted on 
social media that mitigates against any exercise of a right of privacy460 in these circumstances 
and that the reasonable user should expect the posting to travel beyond its original site. 
 
5.3.2.2  Intention 
The person committing the defamation must have the intention to damage another person’s 
reputation in the eyes of the public.461 Therefore dolus is required and culpa would be 
insufficient. In the context of an employee posting a derogatory comment about the employer 
on social media, the employee has the intention to insult or demean the employer in the eyes 
of friends and followers on social media. The employee is usually frustrated, angry or upset 
with the employer and uses social media as an outlet to retaliate against the employer.  
 
The employee thus has the intention to demean the employer publicly or to show everyone 
what a ‘terrible boss’ the employer is. In some instances, the posting of the derogatory comment 
by the employee is done to garner support or sympathy from friends and followers. In other 
instances, the derogatory comment is posted for the purpose of being ‘relatable’ or ‘popular’ 
on social media; or to gain more followers or ‘likes’ based on the derogatory post about the 
employer.  
 
5.3.2.3  Publication 
Defamation occurs when a defamatory statement is communicated from one person to another 
through publication.462 Publication used to mean transmitting a statement, for example, via 
newspapers, radio, or television.463 However, with the rise of the digital age, publishing now 
includes the posting of a statement or comment on a social media account such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, Snapchat and the like.464 
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In the case of Dutch Reformed Church Vergesig Johannesburg Congregation v Rayan 
Sooknunan t/a Glory Divine World Ministries465 Satchwell J stated that individuals who post 
comments on a Facebook page are ‘little different from persons who have attached a scrappy 
piece of paper to a felt notice board in a passage with a pin or stub of Prestik’.466 
 
Therefore, if a piece of paper is available for anyone to view in a public place it is regarded as 
being published in the same way a comment posted on a social media account, is regarded as 
being published. This is because the comment is available in the public domain for anyone to 
view.467 The problem is that employees are ‘often unaware that posting material on social 
media is a form of publication for which they can be held liable’.468 
 
Nel explains that:  
 
‘[w]hen users of social networking sites share information, photos, and other materials, they 
may be held liable to others as ‘publishers’ of the information in the same way that offline 
content publishers such as radio or newspapers are responsible’.469  
 
Nel explains further that:  
 
‘[a]nyone who links to, shares, or re-tweets a defamatory post will be liable for defamation as 
a ‘publisher’. If, for instance, an employee happens to ‘like’ a Facebook post that is 
subsequently deemed defamatory, that simple ‘click’ could have far-reaching consequences 
as the employee is in actual fact ‘publishing’ the defamation’.470 
 
5.3.2.4  Defamatory statement 
A defamatory statement is a statement which reduces the reputation of a person in the eyes of 
the public.471 A derogatory comment may also infringe on the reputation of a person, depending 
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on what was said. Derogatory comments posted on social media by an employee about an 
employer, may also equate to a form of cyberbullying.472  
 
Privitera and Campbell explain that:  
 
‘[c]yberbullying techniques use modern communication technology to send derogatory or 
threatening messages directly to the victim or indirectly to others, to forward personal and 
confidential communication or images of the victim for others to see and to publicly post 
denigrating messages’.473 
 
Snail explains: 
  
‘[t]he exposure of one’s views on a particular issue may be a legal right on a private social 
media page but, if this information were to be leaked, the right to freedom of expression 
must be balanced with the right of others not to be disparaged or defamed’.474  
 
The posting of a derogatory comment on social media, has the potential to be a serious form of 
infringement of the law.475  In the context of derogatory comments posted by the employee 
about the employer on social media, such comment may be of such gravity and seriousness that 
it may infringe on the reputation of the employer.476 As a result, the employer will be entitled 
to dismiss the employee and sue the employee for defamation if the derogatory/defamatory 
comment is not true.477 
 
5.3.2.5  Another person 
The defamatory statement must be about another person.478 With regard to derogatory 
comments posted on social media, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the 
employee and the employer. In the context of an employee posting a derogatory comment on 
social media, such comment must refer to the employer as the other person. 
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In an analysis of derogatory comments in relation to the elements for defamation, it is quite 
clear that derogatory comments can easily amount to defamatory statements which infringe on 
the employer’s reputation in the eyes of the public.479 Therefore, the employee’s freedom to 
post derogatory comments on social media may be limited by the common law action of 
defamation.  
 
5.4.     Analysis of the right to freedom of expression480 in light of the employer’s right to 
dignity481 
 
In the context of an employee posting a derogatory comment about his employer on social 
media, it is clear that the employer’s right to dignity482 is highly valued and that the employer 
is entitled to be treated with respect.483 The Labour Relations Act484 reiterates this right in item 
1(3) of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act485 which states ‘that employers and employees 
should treat one another with mutual respect’ while section 10 of the Constitution states that 
‘everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected’.486 
 
In the case of S v Makwanyane487 O’Regan J stated that:  
 
‘[r]ecognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human 
beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right 
therefore is the foundation of many other rights that are specifically entrenched in [the Bill 
of Rights]’.488 
 
In a scenario where an employee posts a derogatory comment about her employer on social 
media, the employee enjoys the right to freedom of expression489 by imparting this information 
about the employer to her friends and followers on her social media account.  
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However, because this comment is derogatory and because it infringes on the employer’s right 
to dignity490 (that the comment infringed on the employer’s reputation491 or was disrespectful 
to the ‘intrinsic worth’ of the employer);492 the employer may dismiss the employee in terms 
of the Labour Relations Act493 or sue the employee in terms of the law of defamation depending 
on the circumstances. 
 
Therefore, the action of posting a derogatory or defamatory comment about the employer on 
social media is demeaning, insulting and disrespectful to the employer494 and also infringes on 
the employer’s right to dignity495 at the same time. The employee therefore does not have 
unlimited freedom to post derogatory comments about the employer on social media. 
 
5.5     Analysis of the right to freedom of expression496 in terms of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995497 
 
According to Nel ‘a reliance on the defence of freedom of speech does not provide a licence to 
breach a contract of employment’.498  
 
Vries and Moosa explain that:  
 
‘[e]mployees need to keep in mind that the right to freedom of expression is limited. All 
employees should think carefully before posting anything relating to their employers, 
companies, colleagues and clients, and they should never assume that their social media 
network is too small to attract scrutiny from employers or the public’.499 
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Nel explains that: 
 
‘[i]n terms of an employment contract an employee undertakes to promote the interests of the 
employer. This means the right to freedom of speech must also be balanced against the rights 
of the employer’.500  
 
5.5.1 The employment relationship becoming intolerable 
In a scenario where the employee posts a derogatory comment about her employer on social 
media, the employee enjoys her right to freedom of expression501 by imparting this information 
about her employer to her friends and followers on her social media account. However, because 
this comment is derogatory and because the employer and anyone else will be able to gain 
access to; or become aware of the comment on social media, the employer will be able to 
dismiss the employee in terms of item 3(4) of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act.502 This 
item states that an employer may dismiss an employee ‘if the misconduct is serious and of such 
gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable’.503  
 
The sanction of dismissing an employee for posting derogatory comments about the employer 
is to ensure that there is a good working relationship between the employer and employee.504 
The employee’s right to freedom of expression505 is limited only to the extent that she does not 
make derogatory comments about the employer which would impact on the working 
relationship.506 
 
The link between ensuring that there is a good working relationship between the employee and 
employer in the workplace and limiting the employee’s freedom to post a derogatory comment 
on social media is underpinned by the concept of good faith.507 Item 1(3) of Schedule 8 of the 
Labour Relations Act508 states that ‘the key principle in this Code is that employers and 
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employees should treat one another with mutual respect’.509 Therefore the posting derogatory 
comments about the employer by the employee is a serious misconduct because it destroys the 
working relationship between the employee and the employer.510 
 
Having briefly discussed the freedom of expression511 in terms of derogatory comments posted 
on social media, it is submitted that employees do not have an absolute right to freedom of 
expression.512 When an employee posts a derogatory comment about the employer on social 
media, the employee cannot raise the right to freedom of expression513 as a defence against 
being dismissed. This is because the employee’s right to freedom of expression514 may be 
limited, if the derogatory comment posted on social media:  
 
i. amounts to defamation of the employer;  
ii. infringes on the employer’s right to human dignity;515 or  
iii. is of such gravity that it makes the continued employment relationship intolerable in terms 
of the Labour Relations Act.516 
 
In the context of an employee posting a derogatory comment about the employer on social 
media, it is submitted that the courts should apply the two-step test that is provided for in the 
Labour Relations Act,517 which is whether or not there has been a breach of a workplace rule518 
and whether or not there has been a breach of good faith.519 By following this two-step test as 
provided for in the Labour Relations Act,520 the courts will be able to determine whether or not 
dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media are fair.521Having briefly discussed 
the employee’s defence of the right to freedom of expression,522 the employee’s right to 
privacy523 as a defence against being dismissed for derogatory comments posted on social 
media will be discussed briefly.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS IT RELATES TO DEROGATORY COMMENTS 
POSTED BY EMPLOYEES ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
6. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
As a defence to being dismissed for derogatory comments posted on social media, an employee 
may argue that her right to privacy524 has been infringed upon. According to Davey ‘the right 
to privacy is rapidly changing due to social media usage’525  and ‘the right to privacy may be 
relevant to discipline and dismissals for social media misconduct’.526  The right to privacy527 
is relevant for social media misconduct because employees may cite the right to privacy528 as 
a defence against being dismissed for derogatory comments posted on social media.   
 
This perceived right to privacy529 may lead employees to make derogatory comments on social 
media with the mistaken belief that they are protected.530 The right to privacy531 has an 
influence with regard to this topic, but a mistaken understanding of its application may equally 
have an influence, as will be discussed below. 
 
Neethling et al define privacy as:  
 
‘[a]n individual condition of life characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity. 
This condition embraces all those personal facts which the person concerned has himself or 
herself determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which 
he [or she] has the will that they be kept private’.532 
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From this definition, the right to privacy533 protects personal facts of an individual which she 
wishes to be excluded from the public knowledge.534 Personal facts could refer to a person’s 
personal information such as information relating to the education, medical, financial, criminal 
or employment history of the person; and the personal opinions, views or preferences of the 
person.535  
 
6.1     Right to privacy536 in terms of the Constitution of South Africa 
The employee cites the right to privacy from the South African Constitution537 which is used 
as a defence against dismissal for derogatory comments posted on social media.  Section 14 of 
the Constitution538 states that ‘everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not 
to have the privacy of their communications infringed’.539 
 
Various judges and authors have explained the meaning and the importance of the right to 
privacy540 as follows: 
 
In the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of 
Justice and Others541 Langa J held that:  
 
‘[p]rivacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy 
which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the 
outside community’.542 
 
In the case of Deutschmann NO and Another: Shelton v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service543 the High Court described privacy as ‘an individual’s condition of life 
characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity’.544 
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6.2     Limitation of the right to privacy545 in terms of the Constitution of South Africa 
In addition, various judges and authors have explained the limitations of the right to privacy546 
as follows: 
 
In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Smit NO and Others,547 the court explained that ‘privacy is a right which becomes more intense 
the closer it moves to the intimate personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense 
as it moves away from that core’.548   
 
In the case of Bernstein v Bester,549 Ackerman J held that:  
 
‘[t]he courts have had to develop a test to determine the scope and content of the right to 
privacy. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test comprises two questions. Firstly, there 
must at least be a subjective expectation of privacy and, secondly, the expectation must be 
recognized as reasonable by society’.550  
 
In the context of an employee using the right to privacy551 as a defence against being dismissed 
for derogatory comments posted on social media, the employee’s right to privacy552 will be 
determined not only by whether or not the employee subjectively believed that her privacy was 
infringed; but also by whether or not an expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable in 
terms of the legal convictions of the community.553 
 
In Bernstein v Bester,554 Ackerman J held further that:  
 
‘[i]n the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such 
as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from 
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erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This implies that community rights and the 
rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the 
abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society.  
Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal 
relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space 
shrinks accordingly’.555  
 
Currie and De Waal explain that ‘in the truly personal realm an expectation of privacy is more 
likely to be considered reasonable than a privacy expectation in the context of communal 
relations and activities’.556  
 
In the case of Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others557 Madlanga J held: 
  
‘[t]his diminished personal space does not mean that once people are involved in social 
interactions or business, they no longer have a right to privacy. What it means is that the 
right is attenuated, not obliterated. And the attenuation is more or less, depending on how 
far and into what one has strayed from the inner sanctum of the home’.558 
 
Nel explains that: 
  
‘[t]he instant the employee enters into relationships with persons outside of this close intimate 
sphere, his or her activities acquire a social dimension and the right of privacy in this context 
becomes subject to limitation’.559  
 
Social interaction includes the use of social media.560 By using social media to post statements 
or comments, a person’s right to privacy561 becomes diminished and the layer of protection 
decreases.562  
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This is because a person’s comments posted on social media are regarded as communal 
relations.563 The nature of social media sometimes gives the impression that people are in a 
private conversation or in other circumstances it emboldens people who post on social media 
with an unrealistic impression of anonymity. 
 
Having briefly discussed above the judges and authors views on the limitations of the right to 
privacy,564 it is worth assessing the limitation of the right to privacy565 in terms of the 
Constitution. 
 
In the context of the employee posting a derogatory comment about the employer on social 
media, an employer does not infringe on the employee’s right to privacy by legitimately 
accessing the employee’s derogatory comment posted on social media.566 This is because when 
an employee posts a comment on social media and fails to enable the privacy settings on her 
social media account, that comment enters the public domain567 and may still lawfully make 
its way to the employer.568  
 
Therefore, the employee’s right to privacy569 cannot be infringed upon by the employer 
accessing the derogatory comment through legitimate means570 and so the section 36 two-stage 
analysis becomes irrelevant.571 This is because there is no breach of privacy and there is no 
need for the right to privacy572 to be limited by section 36.573 
  
It is submitted that it is irrelevant to take into account whether or not an employee has enabled 
privacy settings on social media. This is because a derogatory comment posted by the employee 
on social media may still make its way into the public domain and may be brought to the 
attention of the employer by someone taking a screenshot, re-posting, republishing or printing 
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the derogatory comments made by the employee.574 There is also the possibility of other 
employees informing the employer about the derogatory comments posted by the employee on 
social media.575  
 
Having briefly discussed the limitation of the right to privacy576 in the context of the 
Constitution, it is necessary to make mention of the right to privacy in terms of the common 
law and other South African legislation. 
 
6.3     Right to privacy in terms of the common law 
For an infringement of the right to privacy to succeed in terms of the common law actio 
iniuriarum, the following elements must be proved namely: impairment of the applicant’s 
privacy, unlawfulness, wrongfulness and intention.577 
 
6.3.1  Impairment of the applicant’s privacy 
An infringement of the right to privacy will occur if another person becomes aware of the 
private facts of the individual without her permission.578 In the scenario of an employee posting 
derogatory comments about her employer on social media, other person/s on the social media 
platform will become aware of the private facts of the employer without the employer’s 
permission. 
 
6.3.2  Unlawfulness 
Currie and De Waal explain that:  
 
‘[t]here are two elements to unlawfulness; the infringement must be subjectively contrary to 
an individual’s will and must also be objectively unreasonable in the sense of being contrary 
to the contemporary boni mores and the general sense of justice of the community as 
perceived by the court’.579 
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In the scenario of an employee posting derogatory comments about her employer on social 
media, the comment posted on social media may be contrary to the employer’s will and may 
also be objectively unreasonable, which will mean that the posting of the derogatory comment 
on social media is unlawful. 
 
6.3.3  Wrongfulness 
In relation to the element of wrongfulness, Roos explains that ‘a de facto infringement of 
privacy will only be wrongful if the infringement is considered unreasonable by the boni mores 
or the legal convictions of the community’.580 
 
In the scenario of an employee posting derogatory comments about her employer on social 
media, the comment posted on social media will be wrongful if it is so unreasonable that it goes 
against the boni mores of the South African community. 
 
6.3.4  Intention 
Currie and De Waal explain that: 
  
‘[i]ntention in the form of animus iniuriandi is required to establish a breach of privacy. 
Animus iniuriandi is presumed once wrongful infringement of privacy has been established 
by the plaintiff; the defendant must then rebut the presumption’.581 
 
In the scenario of an employee posting derogatory comments about her employer on social 
media, in most cases it will be clear that the employee intends to breach the privacy of the 
employer by publicly posting derogatory comments about the employer on social media. 
 
Having briefly discussed the common law position of the right to privacy, it is necessary to 
make mention of the current legislation on privacy in South Africa. 
 
6.4     Laws on privacy in South Africa 
In terms of section 49 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act582 it is an offence to monitor or intercept electronic 
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communications. This Act583 also provides that ‘any person may intercept any communication 
if he/she is a party to the communication, unless such communication is intercepted by such 
person for purposes of committing an offence’.584  
 
This Act585 does not necessarily apply to social media because when a person posts a comment 
on social media, everyone will become a party to that communication as it is not an offence for 
a person to republish, repost or screenshot a social media post.586 
 
Section 86 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act587 states that a person who 
intentionally accesses data without authority or permission is guilty of an offence.  The 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act588 may not necessarily apply to social media 
because the Act589 deals with the access of data and not social media postings.590 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Act591 aims to give effect to the right to informational 
privacy.592 Personal information relates to a natural person or juristic person and includes 
information relating to the education or medical, financial, criminal or employment history of 
the person; and the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person.593  
 
This Act deals with the protection of personal information from the public.594 If a person posts 
personal information on social media, then that person loses the protection of personal 
information because information posted on social media may not remain private.595 
 
In relation to the Protection of Personal Information Act,596 the South African Law Reform 
Commission states that ‘data or information protection forms an element of safeguarding a 
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person’s right to privacy’.597 However, it provides only for the legal protection of a person in 
instances where ‘his or her personal information is being collected, stored, used or 
communicated by another person or institution’.598 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Act599 does not provide any guidelines on the use of 
social media. Roos explains that ‘data protection law is related to privacy but is a narrower 
concept in that it relates only to the processing of personal information’.600  
 
Nyoni and Velempini explain that:  
 
‘[t]he new Act is likely to face a number of challenges since many Internet-based companies 
operate outside the jurisdiction of South Africa. It is not easy to see an immediate solution 
to this challenge of policing international digital cyberspace. A central problem is that 
behaviour on the Web cannot be controlled’.601  
 
Most of the laws dealing with the right to privacy602 in South Africa do not directly apply to 
the protection of the right to privacy603 on social media. However, it is necessary to discuss the 
right to privacy604 as it relates to derogatory comments posted on social media. 
 
6.5     Right to privacy605 as it relates to derogatory comments posted on social media 
The following cases provide examples of how the courts have dealt with an employee’s defence 
of the right to privacy606 for dismissals based on derogatory comments posted on social media: 
 
The case of Sedick and another/ Krisay (Pty) Ltd.607  serves as a prime example of how the 
courts have determined whether or not dismissal was fair in situations where derogatory 
comments have been posted by employees on social media.  
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In this case, the employees were charged with ‘bringing the company’s name into disrepute by 
posting derogatory statements in the public domain’.608 The employer went onto the 
employees’ Facebook page to add the employees as friends.609  Upon accessing the employees’ 
Facebook page, the employer was able to read the posts on the employees’ Facebook pages as 
the privacy settings had not been enabled.610 The employer found derogatory comments posted 
about the management of the company as well as comments by other employees.611 
 
Although the name of the company and employers were not explicitly mentioned on the 
employees’ Facebook page, the public would still have been able to make that connection.612 
The employer stated that the employees’ posts on Facebook were serious enough to warrant 
dismissal because of the following factors: 613   
 
i. the employees represented the company;614   
ii. the employees had dealings with customers and suppliers;615   
iii. the comments posted on Facebook could be accessed by anyone;616 and  
iv. the comments encouraged participation from other employees.617  
 
The employees claimed that their right to privacy618 had been infringed upon when the 
employer accessed their Facebook page,619 and that the posts did not directly refer to the 
employers.620 In making a decision as to whether or not the employees’ privacy621 had been 
infringed upon when the employer accessed the employees’ Facebook pages,622 Bennet J 
applied the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act.623  
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Bennet J stated that social media sites such as Facebook are on the internet, which means that 
they are in the public domain, but users are entitled to restrict access to their social media 
accounts.624 The employees’ right to privacy625 had not been infringed upon because they had 
failed to restrict access to their Facebook pages.626  
 
Therefore, in applying the Act627 any person may be a party to the communication on a social 
media account because it is in the public domain.628 This implies that had the employees 
enabled the privacy settings on their social media account, the employees could have relied on 
the right to privacy.629   
 
Bennet J held that any person will be entitled ‘to intercept, that is, to read, download and print 
these communications in whole or in part’.630 The comments posted by the employees were 
available to the public in the same manner in which other materials are published for public 
access. The employees could therefore not rely on their right to privacy.631 
 
In reaching his judgment Bennet J took into account the following factors:  
 
i. privacy;632   
ii. the content of the comments posted on social media;633  
iii. the circumstances surrounding the comments posted on social media;634   
iv. the breach of good faith by taking into account the employer’s reputation;635 and  
v. whether or not the work relationship had become intolerable.636  
 
It was held that the dismissal was fair.637 In conclusion Bennet J stated that:  
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‘[t]his case emphasises the extent to which employees may and may not rely on the protection 
of statute in respect of their postings on the Internet. The Internet is a public domain and its 
content is, for the most part, open to anyone who has the time and inclination to search it 
out. If employees wish their opinions to remain private, they should refrain from posting 
them on the Internet’.638 
 
The case of Fredericks v Jo Barkett Fashions639 involved the posting of derogatory comments 
on Facebook by an employee.640 The employer was informed that the employee posted 
derogatory comments about the employer on social media. The employer accessed the 
employee’s Facebook page and found derogatory comments made about the employer.641 The 
employer stated that the derogatory comments had a negative impact on other employees and 
customers which may result in a loss of revenue for the company.642 The employee cited the 
right to privacy643 as a defence against dismissal for posting derogatory comments on social 
media and further stated that such dismissal was unfair and too harsh a sanction.644 
 
Ramushowana J assessed the employee’s defence of right to privacy645 by looking at the 
provisions of the Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act.646  It was held that the employee’s defence could not 
be upheld because she had failed to enable the privacy settings on her account, which meant 
that anyone could view and have access to her Facebook page.647   
 
This implies that had the employee enabled the privacy settings on her account, the employee 
could have relied on the right to privacy.648 In addition to determining whether or not the 
employee’s privacy had been infringed upon, Ramushowana J examined whether or not the 
employee had breached a workplace rule.649  It was held that the dismissal was fair.650 
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The case of National Union of Food, Beverage, Wine, Spirits and Allied Workers Union obo 
Arendse v Consumer Brands Business Worcester, a Division of Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd651 
involved an employee who was dismissed for breaching his employer’s IT (Information 
Technology) policy by posting derogatory comments about his employer.652 The employee 
cited the right to privacy as a defence against being dismissed for his comments posted on 
Facebook.653 
 
De Vlieger-Seynhaeve J held that in the instance where an employee does restrict access to his 
Facebook page, ‘the comments posted may fall into a zone of privacy into which an employer 
should not intrude’.654 However the employee may face dismissal or defamation charges if the 
comments are defamatory and the ‘employer comes into possession of the publication by 
legitimate means’.655 
 
De Vlieger-Seynhaeve J held that dismissal would be fair with regard to ‘critical comments 
placed on Facebook’656 in the following circumstances: 
 
i. ‘where an employee fails to restrict access to the site’;657 
ii. ‘where the posting brings the employer into disrepute’;658 and  
iii. ‘where the posting leads to the working relationship becoming intolerable’.659 
 
However, this three-step test in determining whether or not the dismissal of the employee was 
fair was not followed.660  De Vlieger-Seynhaeve J ‘with respect’ followed only the first leg of 
the test and decided that the dismissal was fair because the employee had failed to restrict 
access to his Facebook account.661 
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It is submitted that the tests proposed in the cases of Sedick,662 National Union of Food 663 and 
Fredericks664 are not adequate in determining whether or not dismissals for derogatory 
comments posted on social media are fair.  This is because the employee’s right to privacy665 
for derogatory comments posted on social media is an unsatisfactory defence and the courts 
have not indicated whether or not an employee’s right to privacy666 would be protected had the 
employee enabled the privacy settings on social media.667 
 
Nel states that: 
  
‘[t]o date, the CCMA has to date [sic] adopted a blanket approach – a person who does not 
protect his or her personal information on social media and whose privacy settings are not 
engaged, does not have a right to complain, should that post come to the notice of his or her 
employer. They are deemed to have waived their right to privacy’.668  
 
Instead, the courts should apply the two-step test that is already provided for in the Labour 
Relations Act,669 which is whether or not there has been a breach of a workplace rule670 and a 
breach of good faith.671 By following this two-step test as provided for in the Labour Relations 
Act,672 the courts will be able to determine whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments 
posted on social media are fair. 
 
Nel states that:  
 
‘[o]ne can conclude that, as long as the employer follows the correct procedures and that the 
evidence used against the employee has not been illegally obtained, a dismissal under these 
circumstances could be fair’.673  
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Vries and Moosa explain that ‘social media does not come without its risks and, unfortunately, 
one of the most significant risks is the threat to privacy’.674 The moment a person logs onto a 
social media account that person’s privacy comes under threat.675 This is because if an 
employee has not enabled privacy settings on her social media account, then her online 
presence or comments posted on social media become available to the public in cyberspace.676 
Furthermore, people in cyberspace can ‘like’ or share the post on social media. 
 
Roos explains that ‘an individual’s right to privacy will come under threat on social media in 
the following ways’:677 
 
i. ‘when the user reveals personal information on his or her webpage’;678 
ii. ‘when the SNS [Social Networking Services] operator receives information from the user 
or third parties and processes it’;679  
iii. ‘when third parties gain access to the user's personal information’;680 and  
iv. ‘the launch of 'Facebook places' in August 2011 added a fourth threat to privacy’.681 
 
Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg stated that:  
 
‘[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and different 
kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social norm is just something that has 
evolved over time’.682 
 
A few authors683 have expressed that privacy on social media platforms such as Facebook does 
not guarantee the privacy of the user as discussed below: 
                                                          
674 Vries & Moosa (note 500 above) 38. 
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Shahim states that:  
 
‘[p]rivacy settings on Facebook are by no means fool proof and this is clearly spelt out on the 
website. Thus, users should be cautious in assuming that strangers are unable to access their 
profile and information due to their privacy settings’.684 
 
One of the main aims of Facebook is to communicate with friends, family, and colleagues. 
Social media platforms such as Facebook encourage users to make new friends or gain 
followers in cyberspace. Due to the nature of social media platforms, users are further 
encouraged to be visible and to have an online presence. 
 
Acquisti and Gross provide reasons why users share so much information on social media, such 
as: 
i. ‘changing cultural trends’;685 
ii. ‘familiarity and confidence in technology’;686 
iii. ‘lack of exposure or memory of the misuses of personal data by others can all play a role 
in this unprecedented information revelation’.687 
 
Roos suggests that one of the reasons why individuals reveal information on social media is 
because ‘people will usually do what everyone else is doing’.688   
 
Grimmelman is of the view that:  
 
‘[f]acebook systematically delivers signals suggesting an intimate, confidential, and safe 
setting and people don't think about privacy risks in the way that perfectly rational automata 
would’.689  
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Roos explains that:  
 
‘[a]nother mistake people make is to assume that when one is talking to a friend on Facebook, 
one is in a private space, and since no one but one's friend is listening, one can speak freely. 
Unlike in a restaurant, eavesdroppers on Facebook are invisible. When we speak to people 
in person, non-verbal communication is used to indicate that we expect them to keep quiet 
about what we are discussing - we lean towards them or lower our voice. In the electronic 
environment, these non-verbal cues are absent’.690 
 
The use of the descriptor of ‘friends’ on Facebook is disarming in respect of persons that one 
may never have met or who are mere acquaintances. Users of social media are often of the 
view that their social media accounts are private in the sense that they act as a personal diary. 
This is an unreasonable assumption because there is a difference between posts on a social 
media account and entries in a personal diary.  
 
A person’s posts on social media are available to the public to view, like, comment or repost, 
whereas a person’s entries in a personal diary may remain hidden and kept away from the 
public. If a person writes personal thoughts in a personal diary or a journal that amounts to the 
personal life of a person with which other people cannot interfere.691  
 
However, if a person makes photocopies of her personal thoughts from her diary and distributes 
them to the public, then in this instance other people will have a right to interfere because that 
person has made her private life public692. 
 
Social media acts as a ‘public diary’ where people make their personal thoughts available to 
the public whether or not they have made use of the privacy settings. This is because whether 
or not the employee enables privacy settings on social media, the employer could still gain 
access to those posts through another means and the employee could still be faced with 
dismissal for derogatory posts. 
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Snail states that ‘it may be argued that if a friend makes a screen dump of a Facebook account 
page he or she may not necessarily be infringing [on] your privacy, as you had given them 
access’.693 Vries and Moosa explain that even if privacy settings are set it should always be kept 
in mind that any ‘friend can easily share or screenshot your post’694 and that ‘anything posted 
online may make its way into the public domain’.695 The friends and followers who have access 
to the user’s posts are at liberty to share those posts as there are no laws in place preventing the 
republishing, re-posting or taking a screenshot of social media posts.  
 
Milo and Stein suggest that even though one is in a public space it will be protected if that 
person can establish that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.696 This cannot be applied 
in the context of social media as Milo and Stein explain that a legitimate expectation of privacy 
is in relation to private facts and not personal statements or comments posted on social 
media.697 Therefore a person cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy on social media 
because that person has disclosed her thoughts, comments or opinions to the public willingly 
and at her own risk. 
 
Nyoni and Velempini explain that:  
 
‘[t]he activities of users can be easily tracked online without the awareness or permission of 
users, thereby violating the privacy rights of users. Depending on how this information is 
used, it can later damage or ruin one’s reputation, costing one employment or a political 
office’.698  
 
Roos is of the opinion that an individual’s right to privacy699 should be protected if that person 
has enabled privacy settings on social media700 this is because:  
 
‘[i]nformation revealed to “friends only” should be treated as information that has been 
published to a limited number of persons, and any distribution of that information by third 
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parties to a wider audience should be considered an invasion of the right to privacy that 
should have legal consequences’.701 
 
However, in contrast to Roos, it is submitted that the right to privacy702 is not an adequate 
defence against dismissal. This is because the individual has consented to publication of those 
comments on social media and there are no laws prohibiting third parties from accessing an 
individual’s social media account, republishing, reposting or saving a screenshot of the 
comment/post. 
 
Various authors have made the following comments in support of the submission that the right 
to privacy703 is an inadequate defence for derogatory comments posted on social media: 
 
Nel states that ‘the user who leaves messages on a Facebook page cannot rely on an expectation 
of privacy if the settings of his or her Facebook account have not been set on private’,704 while 
Nyoni and Velempini acknowledge that ‘many individuals risk their privacy by willingly 
posting personal and damaging information online’.705 
 
Singh explains that:  
 
‘[t]he moment that a comment or remark is posted online, there is no turning back. Therefore, 
the ability to delete unsavoury posts and even the author’s account, does not create a 
guarantee that the actual post will be deleted from virtual or actual reality’.706 
 
According to Davey ‘publications in social media have legal implications and it is essential 
that care is taken to avoid liability and damage’,707 while Roos explains ‘the users of SNSs 
(Social Networking Services) should also realise that although they are communicating in 
cyberspace, their actions have real world consequences’.708 Therefore, the consequence of 
employees communicating derogatory comments in cyberspace may result in dismissal by the 
employer. 
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Nel advises that:  
 
‘[d]ue to the nature of the Internet, it is suggested that as a rule of thumb, no user of a social 
network site should post any information that he or she is not willing to have displayed on a 
public notice board for all to see, irrespective of whether privacy settings are used or not. 
There are too many ways in which the information can become known – for instance, when 
one of the close ‘friends’ may disclose the information to co-employees or the employer’.709  
 
Nel further advises that ‘it is clear that the general trend is that there is nothing private about 
anything said on any social media pages, despite what employees might say or raise in their 
defence,’710 while Vries and Moosa caution that what ‘what you would not say to or in front of 
your employer, you should not post on any social media site’.711  
 
Shahim advises that ‘the old adage “if you have nothing good to say then don't say anything at 
all”, should serve as inspiration before updating your Facebook status or tweeting!’,712 while 
Davey cautions that ‘when using social media steer clear of racist, defamatory or controversial 
postings, salacious tweets and malicious statements’.713 
 
In applying the defence of the right to privacy714 for derogatory comments posted on social 
media, the court in the case of Costa/Nu Metro Theatres715 held that:  
 
‘[i]t is now established law that an employee may be disciplined for misconduct that takes 
place outside working hours provided the misconduct negatively impacts on the employment 
relationship’.716 
 
With regard to social media whether a comment was posted during or outside the workplace, 
that post will be published and available in the public domain. Once a comment is in the public 
domain, the employer will be able to access the comment and act in accordance with the Labour 
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Relations Act717 by dismissing the employee. When something is posted on social media, it 
does not matter whether or not the employee posted the comment in the privacy of his home, 
as the comment will be available publicly. 
 
It is submitted that one’s right to privacy718 in relation to social media will be affected only if 
one’s social media has been hacked and if someone unlawfully obtains private information or 
private facts of a person without their consent.   
 
Snail explains that:  
 
‘[w]ith reference to social media accounts everybody has the right not to have his private 
social media account hacked and personal information disseminated, or particulars views 
expressed to the public without their prior consent’.719  
 
The right to privacy720 should therefore not be extended to protecting one’s comments or posts 
on social media which are lawfully accessible to third parties and which can be reposted, 
republished, or saved by third parties. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
 
7. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
This dissertation has highlighted that there has been an increase in dismissals for derogatory 
comments posted by employees on social media. Most importantly, it has raised the question 
as to whether or not the Labour Relations Act721 is fit for purpose in relation to derogatory 
comments posted by employees on social media.  
 
7.1     Provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 which may be applied to dismissals 
for derogatory comments posted on social media 
After analysing the various provisions of the Labour Relations Act722 some of the provisions 
in the Labour Relations Act723 may still be applied to dismissals for derogatory comments 
posted by employees on social media which are as follows: 
 
7.1.1  Misconduct724 
Item 3(5) of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act725 may still be applied and adjusted 
accordingly to the factors726 that the employer will take into account when dismissing an 
employee for derogatory comments posted on social media. 
 
Item 2(2) of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act727 lists ‘the conduct of the employee’ as 
one of the grounds728 for dismissal. This ground729 will apply to dismissals for derogatory 
comments posted on social media. This is because the act of posting a derogatory comment on 
social media amounts to conduct on the part of an employee. 
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If the employer dismisses the employee on this ground730 in terms of the Act,731 it must be 
determined whether or not such conduct732 (the posting of derogatory comments on social 
media) amounts to misconduct733 in terms of the Labour Relations Act.734 Misconduct735 in 
terms of the Labour Relations Act736 encompasses a breach of good faith737 as well as a breach 
of a workplace rule.738 
 
7.1.2  Breach of good faith739 
The concept of breach of good faith740 is a ‘subjective test’ that the courts will take into account 
when determining whether or not dismissals for misconduct741 are fair. The factors that the 
courts will take into account are as follows: 
 
i. the reputation of the employer;742  
ii. the working relationship becoming intolerable;743  
iii. the consequences of the misconduct;744 and  
iv. a number of other factors depending on the situation of the case. 
 
7.1.3  Breach of a workplace rule745 
The concept of breach of a workplace rule746 is an ‘objective test’ that the courts will take into 
account in the form of ‘a check list’747 in terms of the Act.748  The factors that the courts will 
take into account are as follows: 
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i. whether or not the employee has contravened a workplace rule pertaining to social media 
misconduct;749 
ii. whether or not the workplace rule was valid or reasonable;750  
iii. whether or not the employee was aware of the workplace rule;751  
iv. whether or not the workplace rule has been consistently applied;752 and  
v. whether or not dismissal was an appropriate sanction.753 
 
It is submitted that both the concept of good faith754 and the concept of the workplace rule755 
are still valid and applicable in determining whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments 
posted on social media are fair. This is because misconduct756 entails a subjective test (breach 
of good faith757) and an objective test (breach of a workplace rule758) which, if co-applied will 
adequately determine whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social 
media are fair. 
 
7.2     Shortcomings in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
The following provisions of the Act759 have not kept pace with social media and problems have 
arisen in applying the current legislation760 to dismissals for derogatory comments posted on 
social media: 
 
The Act761 does not provide a definition of misconduct762 nor does it provide a definition on 
social media misconduct. The Act763 provides a few examples of serious misconduct,764 but it 
does not mention social media misconduct as an example of serious misconduct. This may lead 
to uncertainty in determining whether or not the Act765 may be applied to this new phenomenon 
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of social media and more specifically to dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social 
media.  
 
7.3     Shortcomings in court decisions 
In analysing the cases, it seems that the courts have become side tracked by issues such as the 
right to privacy766 in determining whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments posted 
on social media are fair. The courts have also been inconsistent in applying the concept of 
breach of good faith767 and breach of the workplace rule768 to determine whether or not 
dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media are fair.  
 
In the case of Fredericks769 the court applied only the objective test of determining whether 
there had been a breach of a workplace rule770 but did not determine the subjective test of 
whether there had been a breach of good faith.771 
 
In the cases of Sedick772and National Union of Food,773 the court applied only the subjective 
test of determining whether there had been a breach of good faith774 but did not determine the 
objective test of whether there had been a breach of the workplace rule.775 
 
7.4     Social media policy 
The workplace rule776 would generally be a rule prohibiting the employees from posting 
derogatory comments on social media. It was therefore submitted that this workplace rule777 
may take the form of a social media policy which businesses may implement in the workplace. 
 
This social media policy will assist the courts in applying the objective test more adequately. 
It will provide clear guidance to employees on what conduct is acceptable and what conduct is 
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not acceptable on social media as well as the consequences thereof. More importantly dismissal 
for derogatory comments posted on social media will be justified.  
 
Along with the risks of non-implementation of a social media policy by businesses, this 
dissertation has highlighted that there are tensions in our law that have been created by the rise 
of social media. These tensions arise when the employees often cite constitutional rights such 
as the right to freedom of expression778 and the right to privacy779 as a defence to being 
dismissed for derogatory comments on social media. 
  
7.5     The right to freedom of expression780 as it relates to derogatory comments on social 
media 
In an analysis of the right to freedom of expression,781 the courts have not specifically dealt 
with the right to freedom of expression782 as a defence against dismissals for derogatory 
comments posted on social media. However, this dissertation has briefly highlighted that the 
right to freedom of expression783 may be limited by the following factors: 
  
i. the common law remedy of defamation;  
ii. the employer’s right to dignity;784 and  
iii. the application of the Labour Relations Act.785  
  
7.6     The right to privacy786 as it relates to derogatory comments on social media 
In an analysis of the right to privacy787 the employee’s right to privacy788 for derogatory 
comments posted on social media has been found to be an unsatisfactory defence789 against 
dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social media. The courts in the cases of 
                                                          
778 Constitution (note 5 above) s 16. 
779 Ibid., s 14. 
780 Ibid., s 16. 
781 Ibid. 
782 Ibid.  
783 Ibid.  
784 Constitution (note 5 above) s 10. 
785 LRA (note 1 above). 
786 Constitution (note 5 above) s 14. 
787 Ibid. 
788 Ibid. 
789 Case law on fair dismissals (note 37 above). 
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Sedick,790 Fredericks791 and National Union of Food792 have also not indicated whether or not 
an employee’s right to privacy793 would have been protected had the employee enabled the 
privacy settings on social media.794  
 
7.7     Concluding comments 
The courts should apply the two-step test that is provided for in the Labour Relations Act,795 
which is whether or not there has been a breach of a workplace rule796 and a breach of good 
faith.797 By following this two-step test as provided for in the Labour Relations Act798 the courts 
will be able to determine whether or not dismissals for derogatory comments posted on social 
media are fair. 
 
In addition, a definition and an example of social media misconduct should be included as a 
form of serious misconduct in item 3(4) of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act.799 This 
would remove all uncertainty in the applicability of the Labour Relations Act800 to dismissals 
for derogatory comments posted on social media. Most importantly businesses and employers 
should be encouraged to implement a social media policy as a workplace rule.801 By 
implementing the above propositions, the Labour Relations Act802 would bring itself into line 
with the recent exponential rise in the use of social media and would adequately be fit for 
purpose.
                                                          
790 Sedick (note 138 above). 
791 Fredericks (note 31 above). 
792 National Union of Food (note 161 above). 
793 Constitution (note 5 above) s 14. 
794 Employees’ privacy settings on social media (note 531 above). 
795 LRA (note 1 above). 
796 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
797 Ibid., Schedule 8, items 1(3) & 3(4). 
798 LRA (note 1 above). 
799 Ibid. 
800 Ibid. 
801 Ibid., Schedule 8, item 7. 
802 LRA (note 1 above). 
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